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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE SIGNIFICANT CASES OF THE HONORABLE THEODORE
MCMILLIAN DURING HIS TENURE ON THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 1978 - 1999

THE HONORABLE DONALD P. LAY*
I first met Judge Theodore McMillian in 1978 at a seminar held in Aspen,
Colorado. He had just been appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. I did not have an opportunity to meet with him on the first day of the
seminar because, as I later learned, he was taken to the hospital the previous
evening owing to problems adjusting to the higher altitude. Thankfully, he
adjusted. Since that first meeting and throughout the last twenty years, we
have become close personal friends. His approach to judicial review focuses
on compassion for humanity and the worth of the individual. Any person who
appears before Judge McMillian can be assured of this simple fact: he will give
their case a full and fair review. Because of his scholastic excellence, his
dedication and compassion for the individual, I am confident that he would
have been seriously considered for elevation to the United States Supreme
Court if he had only been a younger man at the time of the vacancies.
Judge McMillian was born in 1919 in St. Louis, Missouri, the oldest of ten
children raised by his mother, grandmother and stepfather. 1 He attended
Vashon High School in St. Louis, where he was class president and a member
of the National Honor Society. 2 He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Lincoln
University in Jefferson City, Missouri, in 1941, with degrees in mathematics
and physics. 3
He was drafted during World War II and attained the rank of Second
Lieutenant in the Army Signal Corps. 4 After the war, he wanted to become a
physicist or a physician. 5 But due to the limited number of spots open to
African-Americans in medical school at that time, there was a five year wait
before he could be admitted. 6 As a second choice, he applied to the St. Louis
*

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1. Karen L. Tokarz, Comment, Tribute to Judge Theodore McMillian, 52 WASH. U. J. URB
& CONTEMP. L. 5, 6 (1997).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 6-7.
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id.
6. Tokarz, supra note 1, at 7.
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University School of Law. 7 He was accepted and began his brilliant career in
legal studies. Again, he excelled in the classroom and graduated from law
school first in his class. 8 He also became the first African-American inducted
into Alpha Sigma Nu, the National Jesuit Honor Fraternity. 9
Judge McMillian began his career in the law rather humbly. Because no
large firm in St. Louis would hire him, he and another classmate set out on
their own in the outskirts of the downtown St. Louis business area. 10 He left
private practice in 1953 when he was hired as an Assistant Circuit Attorney. 11
In 1956, Governor Phil Donnelly appointed him to the St. Louis Circuit Court
where he presided over various criminal and civil cases. 12 Later, because of
his profound interest in juvenile justice, he served in the Juvenile Court for six
and one-half years. 13 After being passed over twice, Governor Warren
Hearnes appointed him to the Missouri Court of Appeals in St. Louis in 1972.
He was the first African-American appointed to the appellate bench in
Missouri. 14 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter selected Judge McMillian to
become the first African-American on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. 15 Since that time, Judge McMillian has written more than
1,000 opinions as a United States Circuit Judge. 16
Every judicial officer, state or federal, has occasion during their career to
attend many tributes and recognitions for distinguished colleagues. I have
personally attended a plethora of banquets honoring various judicial officers,
including Supreme Court Justices. Of all of these occasions, however, the St.
Louis University School of Law’s banquet in honor of Judge McMillian’s 80th
birthday was the most heartwarming. Over 1,200 lawyers, law professors from
all of the Missouri law schools and many notable citizens of St. Louis and the
State of Missouri attended the tribute that evening. The tribute was held in the
large banquet hall at the new Civic Center in St. Louis. There was not an
empty table. Many of Judge McMillian’s childhood friends attended and made
moving tributes. That evening will always mark a high point in my career. I
was overwhelmed by the demonstration of love and respect for Ted McMillian,

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Tokarz, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 9. Even after his appointment to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge
McMillian continued his interest in juvenile law, regularly attending national meetings of state
judges focusing on improvements in juvenile justice.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. at 13.
16. Tokarz, supra note 1, at 13.
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not only in tribute for his public service, but as a magnanimous recognition of
his personality and greatness.
Judge McMillian’s life exemplifies not only a profound love of the law but
also a personal intimacy with his fellow citizens. Judge McMillian’s modesty
and authenticity have set him above the average jurist. My life and judicial
tenure have been made far richer and more rewarding because of my
relationship with the Honorable Theodore McMillian.
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APPENDIX

CASES AUTHORED BY
THE HONORABLE THEODORE MCMILLIAN

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE, EIGHTH CIRCUIT 1978-1999

Others in this tribute discuss Judge McMillian’s judicial and personal
characteristics as well as the many honors that he has received throughout his
lifetime. As a service to the bench and the bar, however, I thought it useful to
set forth some of the significant decisions that he has written since being
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. I have
therefore set out in this appendix a digest of some of his opinions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & CIVIL RIGHTS
Judge McMillian has been a protector and advocate of the civil and
constitutional rights of all people. The great number of cases exemplifying his
dedication prevents a thorough review of each case, but these selections offer
an insight to Judge McMillian’s strong beliefs. It is perhaps Judge
McMillian’s many opinions involving questions of constitutional law and civil
rights that best exemplify his search for fairness under the law.
For example, in Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 17 church members brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various cities challenging their
ordinances prohibiting church members from placing literature on unattended
vehicles parked on public property. 18 After the district court granted summary
judgment for the cities, Judge McMillian held that the members had standing
to challenge the ordinance, 19 and the ordinances were not narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest. 20 As a result, the Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision . 21
In Franklin v. Lockhart, 22 a prison inmate brought a civil rights complaint
against prison authorities for alleged violations of free exercise and Eighth
Amendment rights. 23 The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous,

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1215, 1218.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Franklin v. Lockhart, 890 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1999]

THE SIGNIFICANT CASES OF THE HONORABLE THEODORE MCMILLIAN

1273

and the inmate appealed. 24 Judge McMillian held that the allegations in the
inmate’s complaint pertaining to work he had to perform while assigned to the
prison hoe squad were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. 25 He
also held that the inmate’s allegation that handling manure and dead animals is
contrary to his Muslim faith was sufficient to state a free exercise claim and
required further factual findings. 26
In Mergens v. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools, 27 the
students of a public secondary school appealed from a district court order
finding that the formation of a Christian bible study club at the high school
violated the Establishment Clause. 28 In reversing the district court, Judge
McMillian held that the public high school was a limited open forum for
purposes of the Equal Access Act (“Act”), and that the Act did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 29
In Stiles v. Blunt, 30 an underage office-seeker moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent state officials from refusing to certify him as a candidate
for the Missouri House of Representatives. 31 Judge McMillian held that the
rational basis standard, rather than the strict scrutiny standard, was appropriate
for determining whether Missouri’s constitutional minimum-age requirement
for state representatives violated equal protection. 32 He found that the age
requirement was “rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in a mature
and experienced legislature,” 33 and that the district court properly refused to
calculate the office-seeker’s age from the date of conception in accordance
with the preamble to the Missouri Abortion Act. 34
In Independent Charities of America, Inc. v. Minnesota, 35 charitable fundraisers brought an action for declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction
against statutory amendments imposing local connection requirements for
participating in the Minnesota state employees’ annual charitable fund-raiser. 36
Judge McMillian held that the amendments did not violate free speech rights of
charities and that the legislature had a rational basis for imposing local
connection requirements in amendments without violating the Equal Protection
24.
25.
26.
27.
1989).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Mergens v. Board of Educ. Of Westside Community Schs., 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1079-80.
Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 269.
Independent Charities of Am., Inc. v. Minnesota, 82 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 794-95.
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Clause. 37 In addition, he reasoned that the amendments in question reasonably
promoted state objectives without violating the Due Process Clause and that
the state was acting as an employer in restricting access to its workplace,
which supported the application of the market participant exception to the
Commerce Clause. 38
DISCRIMINATION
In Moylan v. Maries County, 39 a female ambulance employee filed an
employment discrimination action against the sheriff and the county. 40 The
employee appealed after a jury found against her. 41 Judge McMillian
remanded the case to determine whether the county could be held liable for
creating a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. 42 The
employee, however, failed to preserve her claim with respect to the allegedly
prejudicial opening argument by defense counsel and that issue was not
preserved for appellate review. 43
In Adams v. Nolan, 44 a female police officer brought an employment
discrimination action against the police department because she had been
denied requests for light duty assignments during her pregnancy. 45 In a bench

37. Id. at 797-98.
38. Id. at 798. See also Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 1998) (proffered reasons for
discharge were pretext for discrimination); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997)
(inmate who gave birth subjected to cruel and unusual punishment); Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor
Ctr., 90 F.3d 285 (8th Cir. 1996) (court had no authority to enter judgment in favor of
defendants); Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70 (8th Cir. 1995) (inmate established right not to handle
pork based on religious objections); Schanou v. Lancaster County Sch. Dist. No. 160,, 62 F.3d
1040 (8th Cir. 1995) (distribution of bibles on school grounds upheld); Duckworth v. Ford, 995
F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1993) (protected speech permitted action against fellow public employee);
Shepherd v. Kansas City Call, 905 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1990) (further proceedings necessary to
determine work agreements); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 867 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1989)
(determination of damages from civil rights claim); Hamer v. Brown, 831 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir.
1987) (professor’s public speech protected under First Amendment); Murphy v. Missouri Dep’t
of Corrections, 814 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1987) (total withholding of mail from white supremacist
organization too restrictive); Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1987) (arrest under
unconstitutional ordinance permitted claim for damages); United States v. Norton, 780 F.2d 21
(8th Cir. 1985) (no Sixth Amendment violation for denial of fair cross-section in jury); Hazen v.
Pasley, 768 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (transfer of prisoner’s property to sheriff violated public
policy).
39. Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986).
40. Id. at 747.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 750.
43. Id. at 751.
44. Adams v. Nolan, 962 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1992).
45. Id. at 792.
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trial, the district court denied relief and the officer appealed. 46 In reversing the
district court, 47 Judge McMillian held the police department’s proffered
reason for denying the requested light duty assignments was pretextual, and the
officer was entitled to relief on her Title VII sex discrimination claim. 48
FEDERAL PROCEDURE & JURISDICTION
Judge McMillian wrote many opinions involving various jurisdictional
issues. 49 Several of his opinions also dealt with procedural questions presented
on appeal, which allowed for a wide variety of holdings. 50

46. Id.
47. Id. at 796.
48. Id. Judge McMillian has written over 200 cases involving all aspects of employment
discrimination. The following cases are illustrative of the issues he confronted. See generally,
Widoe v. Dist. No. 111 Otoe County Sch., 147 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 1998) (reversing grant of
summary judgment on grounds that evidence of pretext existed which masked the Board’s age
discrimination); O’Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1995) (reversing in part
grant of summary judgment on grounds that evidence of pretext existed within age discrimination
claim); Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing dismissal
and remanding on grounds that state law handicap discrimination claim was not preempted by
Railway Labor Act); Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1994)
(reversing grant of summary judgment based on defendant-temple’s lack of immunity from age
discrimination claims); Throgmorton v. United States Forgecraft Corp., 965 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.
1992) (affirming a finding of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII based on the employer’s
failure to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff in response to
the plaintiff’s prima facie case); Shepherd, 905 F.2d at 1152 (reversing finding for defendant and
remanding to determine key procedural issue); Propst v. Leapley, 886 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1989)
(reversing finding of no racial discrimination by prison officials against inmate as “clearly
erroneous”); Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. Of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming
finding of racial discrimination in violation of statute guaranteeing all persons the same rights as
white citizens); Crutchfield v. Maverick Tube Corp., 854 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming
finding of no sex discrimination by employer based on employee’s inability to perform duties of
the position); EEOC v. M.D. Pneumatics, Inc., 779 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing denial of
retroactive seniority to victims of sex discrimination and finding district court to have abused its
discretion in so denying); Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing on
grounds that district court’s refusal to consider retaliatory discharge claim was improper based on
plaintiff’s success in establishing a prima facie case and remanding with directions for
determination of defendant-university’s entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Heath v.
John Morrell & Co., 768 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing grant of summary judgment based
on both evidence of pretext and the refusal to give finding of proper discharge in prior
unemployment compensation proceeding preclusive effect).
49. See generally United States v. Yankton 163 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 1999) (accessory after
the fact not subject to exception to federal jurisdiction); Carney v. BIC Corp, 83 F.3d 629 (8th
Cir. 1996) (dismissed appeal for lack of jurisdiction); Meyers v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 983 F.2d 905
(8th Cir. 1993)(malpractice claim dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction); Insurance Co. of
Pennsylvania v. Syntex Corp., 964 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1992) (pending parallel state claim
permitted dismissal); National City Bank v. Coopers and Lybrand, 802 F.2d 990 (8th Cir.
1986)(remand order not reviewable); Northwest S.D. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323
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The jurisdictional case with the most interesting implication was Kaiser v.
Memorial Blood Center of Minneapolis, Inc. 51 In Kaiser, a patient brought a
negligence action against the blood bank after allegedly contracting human
immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) due to inadequate screening of donors and a
failure to warn of the risk of HIV infection through blood transfusion. 52
Writing for the court, Judge McMillian held that the Red Cross charter
established original federal jurisdiction and that the action accrued for
limitations purposes when a patient received a blood transfusion during
surgery. 53
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
One of the more significant cases dealing with agency review was Wilkins
v. Secretary of Interior, 54 which involved a challenge to a decision by the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior to remove wild horses from a
national park. 55 The district court permanently enjoined removal of the horses,
but Judge McMillian reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly
applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 56
(8th Cir. 1986) (statute did not create federal casue of action on Indian trust lands); U.S. v. South
Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981) (obligation to accept non-Indians in order to obtain HUD
financing did not defeat federal jurisdiction); U.S. v. French, 628 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1980)
(Hobbs Act extortion did not affect interstate commerce).
50. See, e.g., St. Croix Waterway Ass’n v. Meyer, 178 F.3d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 1999) (slowno wake regulations not unconstitutionally vague and did not violate public trust doctrine);
Marshall v. Warwick, 155 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 1998) (service of process to mother’s place
of employment not sufficient); Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir.
1998) cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1028 (1999) (Title VII filing requirement not tolled where
circumstances causing late filing were never beyond party’s control); Harris v. Folk Constr. Co.,
138 F.3d 365, 371 (8th Cir. 1998) (delegation of duties that require final and independent
determination of fact or law to magistrate judge not within authority of the district court); Hillary
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 123 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 1997) (filing of complaint in
wrong state not adequate exception to circumvent defense of res judicata); Renfro v. Swift
Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1460, 1464 (8th Cir. 1995) (no waiver of right to claim breach of contract
by accepting non-conforming performance); Scheerer v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 16 F.3d 272,
275 (8th Cir. 1994) (material issue of fact existed regarding slippery condition in restaurant);
Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1994) (inmate lacked standing to assert denial of
access without a total denial of such access or actual injury or prejudice); Johnson v. United
States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 939 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1991) (tenants not entitled to
attorney fees under Equal Access to Justice Act); Photolab Corp. v. Simplex Specialty Co., 806
F.2d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 1986) (foreign defendants waived objection to sufficiency of service of
process).
51. Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 977 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1992).
52. Id. at 1281.
53. Id. at 1283.
54. Wilkins v. Secretary of Interior, 995 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993).
55. Id. at 851.
56. Id. at 853.
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In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 57 the airline sought review of a
Department of Transportation rule that allocated reservations of take-off and
landing slots at Washington National Airport. 58 Judge McMillian determined
that the order was reviewable 59 and the Department had the authority to issue
the rule. 60 Further, he held the rule was not arbitrary and capricious, 61 the
comment period limitation was for good cause, 62 and an environmental impact
statement was not required. 63
Throughout many of Judge McMillian’s administrative law opinions, he
often cited to the failure of one party to exhaust administrative remedies. 64
These cases offer examples of Judge McMillian’s belief in fair administrative
proceedings.
TORTS
Judge McMillian has had the opportunity to write many opinions which
fall under the broad umbrella of tort law. 65 Illustrative of the complexity of
these cases was Wright v. Farmers Co-Op of Arkansas & Oklahoma. 66 In that
case, the owners of a motor home brought suit against the Farmers Co-op
seeking recovery for injuries received after a propane tank in the motor home,
which was over-filled by the co-op’s employee, exploded. 67 Judge McMillian

57. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1981).
58. Id. at 1311.
59. Id. at 1314.
60. Id. at 1317.
61. Id. at 1318.
62. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d at 1321.
63. Id. at 1322.
64. See, e.g., Sharps v. United States Forest Serv., 28 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure
to exhaust administrative remedies); Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218,
222, 223-24 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint based on failure to file timely
administrative appeal and establish official policy, custom, or practice elements of §§ 1981 and
1983 claims); Boge v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., 976 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1992)
(equitable considerations did not excuse failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Shatz v.
United States Dep’t of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1989).
65. See, e.g., Brosnahan v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 892 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 1989)
(question of adequate supervision of boarding process by airline and whether injury was
foreseeable suitable for jury to decide); Rolfes v. International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 471, 474
(8th Cir. 1987) (submitting products liability assumption of risk defense to jury improper); City
of Omaha v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 767 F.2d 457, 459-60 (8th Cir. 1985) (statute
of limitations appropriately based on professional negligence or breach of warranty); Anderson v.
United States, 724 F.2d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 1983) (Feres doctrine barred Federal Torts Claims Act
suit); Peterson v. Auto Wash Mfg. & Supply Co., 676 F.2d 949, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1982) (failure to
warn action denied for contributory fault); Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 621 F.2d 902, 908
(8th Cir. 1980) (tortious conduct of employer not barred by statute of limitations).
66. Wright v. Farmers Co-op of Ark. & Okla., 620 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 696.
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reversed the trial court, holding that it improperly instructed the jury to enter a
verdict for the defendant if the jury found mechanical failure was the
proximate cause of the fire. 68 He held that the instruction was unsupported by
the evidence and could have misled the jury. 69
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
Judge McMillian has written numerous opinions involving issues dealing
with labor relations. 70 Among the most notable is Pony Express Courier,
Corp. v. NLRB. 71 Pony Express Courier Corporation petitioned for review of a
final order of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), which found that
the Company had refused to bargain in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”). 72 Judge McMillian granted enforcement of the order
and held there was substantial evidence to support the NLRB’s determinations
that the courier-guards were not “guards” within the meaning of the NLRA and
that the dispatchers were not “supervisors” within the meaning of the NLRA. 73
In Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB, 74 the
Ranch, a religiously-affiliated residential treatment center for children that was
recognized as a “church” by the Internal Revenue Service, sought review of an
68. Id.
69. Id. at 697.
70. NLRB v. American Linen Supply Co., 945 F.2d 1428, 1433 (8th Cir. 1991) (employer
illegally discharged economic strikers); Hall v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1991) (antiunion motivation was underlying factor for layoff and discharge); Waverly-Cedar Falls Health
Care Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 1991) (nurses not “supervisors” for purposes
of certifying a bargaining unit); Bryan Mem’l Hosp. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 1259, 1263 (8th Cir.
1987) (withdrawal of recognition from union violated Labor Relations Act); Wright Mem’l Hosp.
v. NLRB, Region 17, 771 F.2d 400, 407 (8th Cir. 1985) (enforced NLRB order requiring hospital
to bargain with a union); Teamsters Local Union No. 688 v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir.
1985) (misapplication of the law by NLRB required a remand); NLRB v. Winco Petroleum Co.,
668 F.2d 973, 978 (8th Cir. 1982) (successor employer was obligated to remedy predecessor’s
unfair labor practices); Beaird-Poulan Div., Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 589, 595 (8th
Cir. 1981) (union election was not required to be set aside); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
NLRB, 641 F.2d 553, 560 (8th Cir. 1981) (renewal of probationary period after strike was unfair
labor practice); NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, St. Louis, Mo., 618 F.2d 1249, 1261
(8th Cir. 1980) (Postal Service not in violation of National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v.
Vitronic Div. of Penn Corp., 630 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1979) (requirement to sign request for
reinstatement not an unfair labor practice); Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310,
1316 (8th Cir. 1979) (substantial evidence supported violation of labor act); NLRB v. Int’l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, Local 265, 604 F.2d 1091,1098 (8th Cir. 1979) (use of terms in picketing
imported meaning in union’s request); American Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 132, 138
(8th Cir. 1979) (employer required to cease enforcing rules regulating writing, making and
distributing of statements by employees).
71. 981 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1992).
72. Id. at 358 (361).
73. Id. at 365-65.
74. 752 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1985).
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order of the NLRB requiring it to bargain with the union representing the
center’s employees. 75 Judge McMillian held the assertion of jurisdiction by
the NLRB over the treatment center did not pose a significant risk of
governmental entanglement with religion, nor did it violate the Free Exercise
or Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. 76 In so holding, Judge
McMillian noted the center’s primary purpose was the care of children, not the
propagation of faith. 77 There were no ministers on the staff at the center, and
the lay staff, chosen without regard to religious beliefs or affiliations, did not
propagate tenets of church. 78 Furthermore, the center’s staff did not conduct
religious classes or services and did not attempt to persuade children to accept
the church’s sectarian doctrines. 79 Finally, Judge McMillian found that
ministers of various denominations from throughout the community conducted
services at the center, and the center and its employees performed essentially
secular functions. 80
In NLRB v. Van Gorp Corp., 81 the NLRB petitioned for enforcement of its
order requiring the employer to bargain with the union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for some of its employees. 82 Judge McMillian held
the cumulative effect of serious last-minute misrepresentations by the union
and the threatening course of conduct of the union supporters showed that the
union election took place in an atmosphere, so hostile to an employee’s free
choice so as to preclude the certification of the union. 83 Thus, the court held
the Board’s certification of the union should be set aside. 84

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 346.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch, 752 F.2d at 348.
Id.
615 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 759-60.
Id. at 765-66.
Id. at 766.
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PROPERTY, TRUSTS & ESTATES
In North Dakota ex rel. Board of University & School Lands v. United
States, 85 North Dakota brought an action against the United States seeking to
quiet title for portions of the riverbed of the Little Missouri River in which the
United States claimed a fee ownership interest. 86 Judge McMillian affirmed
the district court’s decision in favor of the United States, holding that evidence
supported a finding the river was not navigable at the time of North Dakota’s
statehood 87 and that, therefore, the United States had fee title to the property. 88
In Kane v. United States 89 a home purchaser brought an action against the
United States to recover for the presence of asbestos within the house. 90 In
affirming the district court, Judge McMillian held that the “discretionary
function” exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity protected the United
States from liability for the failure of the Veterans Administration and its
management broker to inspect the house for asbestos prior to the sale of the
house. 91 The court also held that because the house contained asbestos, it was
a “consumer product in consumer use” and, therefore, was not a “facility”
within the meaning of the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). 92
In Knox v. Lichtenstein, 93 a bank attempted to permanently enjoin the
trustees of two profit-sharing trusts from proceeding with a civil action for
breach of fiduciary duties against the bank. 94 The district court denied the
85. 972 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 236.
87. Id. at 240.
88. Id.
89. 15 F.3d 87 (8th Cir. 1994).
90. Id. at 88.
91. Id. at 88-89.
92. Id. at 89. For additional property decisions see Universal Title Ins. Co. v. United States,
942 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1991) (release of federal tax lien sought in net proceeds of sale); In
re Holiday Intervals, Inc., 931 F.2d 500, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1991) (land sale contracts not
instruments within meaning of Missouri Uniform Commercial Code); Glosemeyer v. MissouriKansas-Texas R.R., 879 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1989) (challenge to use of railroad line as
recreational trails); Paulucci v. City of Duluth, 826 F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 1987) (denied claim of
taking for non-public use); Herring v. United States, 781 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1986) (owner
was prevailing party after recognition of right to just compensation); United States v. 341.45
Acres of Land, 751 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1984) (denial of costs and fees after condemnation
permitted); Hockett v. Larson, 742 F.2d 1123, 1125-26 (8thCir. 1984) (quit claim deed partially
valid with one valid signature); Caffrey Farms, Inc. v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 739 F.2d 1366,
1368 (8th Cir. 1984) (pipeline easements not subject to reformation); Collier v. City of
Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1984) (adequate state remedies preempted federal
takings claim); United States v. 38.60 Acres of Land, 625 F.2d 196, 200 (8th Cir. 1980) (impaired
drainage in condemnation not compensable as severance damages).
93. 654 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 19-20.
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bank’s motion. 95 On appeal, Judge McMillian held the district court had
properly exercised its discretionary authority in dismissing the trustees’
action. 96 Additionally, that dismissal did not operate as an adjudication on the
merits, which would have permitted an injunction of the related state court
action under the doctrine of res judicata. 97
In Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States, 98 a trust created by the
taxpayer’s daughter filed a wrongful levy action against the United States. 99 In
turn, the United States filed a counterclaim to reduce the tax assessments to the
judgment. 100 Judge McMillian held the taxpayer’s disclaimer of his mother’s
estate under Arkansas law did not void state law interests already established
under Arkansas law. 101 Therefore, the court decided the federal liens were
enforceable against the trust. 102
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & ANTITRUST
In Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Industries, Inc., 103 the designer and seller of
quick-change drill chucks, brought an infringement claim under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, against the manufacturer of component parts
for the designer after the manufacturer began developing its own competing
products. 104
The district court entered summary judgment for the
manufacturer. 105 Judge McMillian reversed and remanded, holding the district
court was required to apply judicially established factors in evaluating the
likelihood of confusion. 106 He further held the district court erred in placing
primary weight on its visual examination of the products107 and material issues
of fact existed as to the likelihood of confusion, distinctiveness, and
functionality. 108

95. Id. at 19.
96. Id. at 22.
97. Id. See also Robbins v. Iowa Rd. Builders Co., 828 F.2d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1987)
(allowed action by trustees to recover delinquent contributions).
98. 152 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1998).
99. Id. at 893.
100. Id. at 897.
101. Id. at 899.
102. Id.
103. 95 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1996).
104. Id. at 665-66.
105. Id. at 665.
106. Id. at 669.
107. Id. at 670.
108. Insty*Bit, Inc., 95 F.3d at 672, 674. See also Morrill v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 747
F.2d 1217, 1219 (8th Cir. 1984) (inventor brought claim of fraud and breach of contract against
manufacturer).
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In John Deere & Co. v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 109 the plaintiff again
brought suit under the Lanham Act to enjoin the defendant from using the
word “furrow” as the name and service mark of its retail stores and on its
advertisements. 110 After review, the district court denied the relief. 111 In
affirming the district court, Judge McMillian stated the plaintiff was not
entitled to injunctive relief because of its failure to associate the “furrow”
trademark with any of its products. 112 The court also held the district court’s
determination that there was no likelihood of confusion because of the vast
difference in the styles and types of advertisements was not clearly
erroneous. 113
In United States v. Misle Bus & Equipment Co., 114 the defendants were
convicted of conspiracy to suppress competition surrounding the “sale of
school bus bodies to public school districts in Nebraska and western Iowa,” in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 115 In holding the
convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, Judge McMillian opined
there was evidence of a similar bid-rigging/market allocation scheme
admissible to show intent. 116 He also held lay testimony describing the
agreements to fix prices and allocate the market was admissible 117 and that the
jury instructions did not over-emphasize the government’s multiple theories of
liability. 118
109. 681 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 522.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 523.
113. Id at 524. See also Applied Innovations, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 876 F.2d
626, 627 (8th Cir. 1989) (university brought action against developer for infringement of
psychological test); Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 675 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1982) (denied
injunctive relief for trademark infringement ); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1088
(8th Cir. 1980) (trademark infringement required issuance of an injunction).
114. 967 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1992).
115. Id. at 1227, 1229.
116. Id. at 1233-34.
117. Id. at 1234.
118. Id. at 1235. See also North Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184
F.3d 732, 739-40 (8th Cir. 1999) (company immune from federal antitrust liability under state
action immunity doctrine); Local Union 257, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Sebastion Elec., 121
F.3d 1180, 1186 (8th Cir 1997) (fund to reimburse wages to union members not antitrust
violation); Jackson v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1452, 1460 (8th Cir. 1995) (Sherman Act fouryear limitation period applied to Packers and Stockyards Act); Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d
1291, 1294 (8th Cir. 1994) (surgeon brought suit against group medical practice alleging
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act); In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 993 F.2d 152,
154 (8th Cir. 1993) (claims to certain antitrust settlement funds properly denied as untimely);
Minnesota Transp. Regulation Bd. v. United States, 966 F.2d 335, 341 (8th Cir. 1992) (Interstate
Commerce Commission applied to property purchases); South Dakota Collectibles, Inc. v.
Plough, Inc., 952 F.2d 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1991) (representative lacked standing to sue for antitrust
damages); Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Med. Soc’y, 851 F.2d 1020, 1032 (8th Cir.
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TAXATION
Although most of Judge McMillian’s tax opinions involve the federal
government and a private taxpayer, 119 some involve tax disputes among
governmental bodies. Such was the case in Minnesota Department of Revenue
v. United States, 120 a dispute over the priority of certain tax liens. The district
court held the state’s tax liens were perfected (choate) at the time the tax
returns were filed, not when processed, thereby granting priority over federal
tax liens. 121 Judge McMillian reversed the district court, determining that the
state tax liens were not entitled to priority and that they were not established at
the time the state tax returns were filed because, under federal law, the state
must take administrative action to acknowledge taxpayer liability before its
liens could be choate. 122
1988) (dismissed claims against non-profit health care service corporation ); In re Hops Antitrust
Litig., 832 F.2d 470, 473-74 (8th Cir. 1987) (antitrust action deemed to be an equitable, not a
legal, action); L & H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769 F.2d 517, 519-20 (8th Cir.
1985) (awarding of franchise by city shielded from antitrust liability by state action immunity
doctrine); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 759 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1985) (enjoining party from
terminating defendant’s exclusive contract not abuse of discretion by district court); Surman v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1984) (state fraud claims
subject to arbitration); Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 704 (8th Cir. 1984)
(burden of generation of monopoly pricing minimized by anti-competitive effect); Russell Stover
Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1983) (refusal to sell to dealers not selling at
suggested prices not coercion); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 1982)
(termination of dealer for pricing protection violated Sherman Act); Yellow Forwarding Co. v.
Atlantic Container Line, 668 F.2d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 1981) (conference agreements exempt from
federal antitrust laws); Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass’n, 666 F.2d
1130, 1146 (8th Cir. 1981) (exclusive foundation preparation policy constituted illegal tying
arrangement).
119. In re Brown, 82 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 1996) (failed to rebut prima facie validity of IRS
proof of claim); Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1996) (insurance
premiums were not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expense); Norwest Corp. v.
Commissioner., 69 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995) (taxpayer not entitled to foreign tax credit); Baptiste
v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 1994) (transferee’s obligation to pay tax was res
judicata); Hefti v. Commissioner, 983 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1993) (third party summons tolled
limitations period for action by IRS); Billion v. U.S., 921 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1990) (taxpayer not
entitled to interest after IRS errors); U.S. v. Claes, 747 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1984) (enforcement of
IRS summons deemed valid); Snell v. U.S., 680 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1982) (taxpayers not entitled
to deductions or reductions because of new partners); Universal Title Ins. Co. v. U.S., 942 F.2d
1311 (8th Cir. 1991) (insurer was not entitled to be subrogated to lienholders who were senior to
federal tax lien); Noske v. U.S., 911 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1990) (penalty could not be applied
retroactively); United States v. Williams, 815 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1987) (executive director not
personally responsible for payment of employment taxes); Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner,
667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981) (income delivered after seller’s death not income in respect to
decedent).
120. 184 F.3d 725, (8th Cir. 1999).
121. Id. at 726.
122. Id. at 730-31.
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In Shangreau v. Babbitt, 123 the mother and heir of a deceased illegitimate
child whose father predeceased him challenged the constitutionality of the
definition of “heir” in the White Earth Land Settlement Act of 1985
(“WELSA”).
WELSA barred an illegitimate child from inheriting
compensation for an allotment by right of representation through the father. 124
Judge McMillian held, in affirming the grant of summary judgment, that the
differences between proving paternity and maternity justified the different
treatment of paternal inheritance by illegitimate children, and that the
definition of heir did not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate
children. 125
CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE & SENTENCING
In United States v. Johnson, 126 following the denial of a motion to suppress
evidence found as the result of a search and seizure of an express mail
package, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Judge
McMillian reversed the district court, holding that the particularized facts of
the case did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
to warrant the interception and detention of the express mail package. 127
In United States v. Leisure, 128 defendants were convicted by a jury of
various racketeering, obstruction of justice, and unauthorized creation of
destructive devices offenses. On appeal, Judge McMillian affirmed in part and
reversed in part. 129 He affirmed the district court’s determination that the
affidavits used in support of the applications for electronic surveillance were
sufficient. 130 He also affirmed the district court’s finding that there was no
prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal. 131
But he reversed the
conviction of one of the defendants because the indictment failed to
sufficiently allege a violation of the statute as amended. 132
In United States v. Dixon, 133 the defendants appealed from a district court
order denying their motions to dismiss the indictment pending against them

123. 68 F.3d 208 (8th Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 212.
125. See Id. at 212-13; See also Lannan v. Maul, 979 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1992) (personal
administrator sued for breach of contact).
126. 171 F.3d 601 (8th Cir. 1999).
127. Id. at 605.
128. 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1988).
129. Id. at 1368.
130. Id. at 1354-59 (discussing the reasoning for sufficiency of affidavits used in support of
the applications for surveillance).
131. Id. at 1360.
132. Id. at 1367.
133. 913 F.2d 1305, 1306 (8th Cir. 1990).
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after the district court had declared a mistrial. Judge McMillian reversed the
district court, holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 134 In reviewing the
double jeopardy claims, Judge McMillian held the district court’s sua sponte
declaration of a mistrial because of prejudicial television news reports was not
justified by manifest necessity, and, thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
re-prosecution of the defendants. 135
In United States v. Childress, 136 a defendant was convicted of three counts
of firearms violations from which he later appealed. A panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions. 137
Following an en banc rehearing on the issue of the government’s use of
peremptory challenges to remove almost all African-American prospective
jurors from the jury panel, Judge McMillian, writing for the en banc court, held
that the government’s use of its peremptory challenges to remove four of five
African-American prospective jurors did not establish a systematic exclusion
of African-Americans from the jury process. 138
In United States v. Iron Cloud, 139 a criminal defendant was sentenced for
his escape from a halfway house where he was serving the final portion of his
sentence. In vacating the sentence and remanding the case, Judge McMillian
held that the district court clearly erred by imposing a three-level upward
adjustment for assaultive behavior and creating the risk of serious bodily injury
to an officer in the course of an offense or immediate flight. 140
HABEAS CORPUS, PRISONER’S RIGHTS
Judge McMillian has written many cases involving the issues of habeas
corpus and prisoner’s rights throughout his time on the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. He has denied habeas relief far more than he has granted it, 141 but all
134. Id. at 1308-09.
135. Id. at 1315.
136. 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983).
137. Id. at 1313.
138. Id. at 1320-21.
139. 75 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1996).
140. Id. at 391.
141. Judge McMillian denied habeas corpus petitions over sixty times while on the court.
Predka v. Iowa, 186F.3d 1082(8th Cir. Aug. 4, 1999) (use of state drug tax stamp law did not
violate the Commerce Clause); Al-Din v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc
denial of motion to dismiss); Stallings v. Delo, 117 F.3d 378 (8th Cir. 1997) (jury verdict not
coerced nor due process violation); Vogt v. U.S., 88 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 1996) (failure to request
competency hearing not ineffective assistance of counsel); Frizzell v. Hopkins, 87 F.3d 1019 (8th
Cir. 1996) (claim not novel and failed to allege factual innocence); Krimmel v. Hopkins, 56 F.3d
873 (8th Cir. 1995) (ineffective counsel claims procedurally defaulted); Allen v. Nix, 55 F.3d 414
(8th Cir. 1995) (failed to establish constitutional violation); United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571
(8th Cir. 1995) (perjured testimony did not affect jury’s judgment); Krimmel v. Hopkins, 44 F.3d
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704 (8th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment violations procedurally barred); Griffini v. Mitchell, 31
F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1994) (reliance upon timely access to release date no cause to excuse
procedural default); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure of postconviction
relief counsel to file separate notice of appeal not cause to excuse procedural default); Hughes v.
Lee County Dist. Court, 9 F.3d 1366 (8th Cir. 1993) (twenty-four hour notice of disciplinary
proceeding sufficient for due process); Narcisse v. Dahm, 9 F.3d 38 (8th Cir. 1993) (claim of
legal innocence, not actual innocence, did not present extraordinary case permitting relief);
Pickens v. Lockhart, 4 F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1993) (claim of coerced confession procedurally
barred); Freeman v. Erickson, 4 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (confrontation rights not violated);
Glaze v. Redman, 986 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1993) (exclusion of evidence not deprivation of
fundamentally fair trial); Parkus v. Delo, 985 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1993) (notice of appeal
premature); Garcia v. Powers, 973 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992) (state law corroboration requirement
not cognizable under habeas review); McCann v. Armontrout, 973 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992)
(evidentiary hearing not required for effectiveness question at state trial); Bruns v. Thalacker, 973
F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1992) (failure to establish actual prejudice to overcome procedural bar); Perez
v. Groose, 973 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1992) (evidence supported conviction); Starchild v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 973 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1992) (house arrest time not credited to sentence);
Stewart v. Nix, 972 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1992) (ninety-five day delay in trial was not Fifth
Amendment violation); Harris v. Lockhart, 948 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1991) (failure to prove actual
innocence); Whatley v. Morrison, 947 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1991) (prisoner failed to exhaust all
state remedies); Simpson v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1991) (state murder statutes not
unconstitutionally vague); Rapheld v. Delo, 940 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1991) (failure to establish
actual innocence); Williamson v. Jones, 936 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1991) (no error in trial court
refusal to give specific jury instruction); Mills v. Armontrout, 926 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1991)
(decision not to impeach witness not cognizable in habeas review); Wright v. Lockhart, 914 F.2d
1093 (8th Cir. 1990) (no denial of Sixth Amendment right to fair and impartial jury); Epps v.
Iowa, 901 F.2d 1481 (8th Cir. 1990) (change of venue not a constitutional violation); Adams v.
Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1990) (failure to state specific, particularized fact for relief);
Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1990) (no denial of effective assistance of
counsel); Sumpter v. Nix, 863 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1988) (no violation of double jeopardy because
of sentences imposed); Aschan v. Auger, 861 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1988) (no violation of pretrial
agreement); Amos v. Minnesota, 849 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusal to give instruction on
lesser-included offense proper); U.S. v. Hutchings, 835 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1987) (motions filed in
incorrect judicial district); Perry v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 831 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1987) (untimely
revocation hearing not prejudicial); Wiggins v. Lockhart, 825 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1987)
(allegations insufficient to establish equal protection violation); High Elk v. Solem, 804 F.2d 496
(8th Cir. 1986) (failure to show that inclusion of evidence would have changed the verdict);
Johanson v. Pung, 795 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1986) (self defense instruction not due process
violation); Thrasher v. Armontrout, 784 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1986) (victim identification reliable);
Beard v. Lockhart, 779 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1985) (possession of firearm sufficient to violate terms
of parole); Warden v. Wyrick, 770 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1985) (denial of mistrial not violation of
constitutional right to a fair trial); Johnson v. Mabry, 752 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1985) (failure to
interview witness not sufficient to affect decision to accept plea bargain); Graham v. Solem, 728
F.2d 1533 (8th Cir. 1984) (victim identification testimony not constitutional violation); Cole v.
Hunter, 726 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1984) (psychiatrist’s testimony not Fifth Amendment violation);
Thompson v. Missouri, 724 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1984) (non-disclosure of information not denial
of fair trial or due process); Hartung v. Omodt, 687 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1982) (placement in
juvenile facility did not constitute adjudication or permitting claim of double jeopardy); In re
Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982) (extraditable offenses not within scope of habeas
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of his opinions exemplify his thorough examination of the prisoner’s diverse
claims. 142
In Walton v. Caspari, after a criminal defendant’s convictions were
affirmed, the defendant brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 143 The
district court conditionally granted the petition and an appeal was taken. 144 In
affirming the decision, Judge McMillian wrote that the defendant had fairly
presented his equal protection claim to the state court. 145 He held that the
district court did not err in retroactively applying the rule set forth in Garrett v.
Morris. 146 Garrett held that once prosecutors volunteer their reasons for the

review); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1982) (failure to establish cumulative errors);
Rhodes v. Foster, 682 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1982) (no constitutional violation as proceeding not
detrimentally affected); Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981) (state’s refusal to examine
claims of state procedural errors not cognizable for habeas review); Holiday v. Wyrick, 663 F.2d
789 (8th Cir. 1981) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel not construed to be included);
Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1981) (failure to raise claims before state or district
court precluded consideration of claims by court of appeals); Lindner v. Wyrick, 644 F.2d 724
(8th Cir. 1981) (lack of exhaustion of state claims prevented further review); Bradley v. Fairfax,
634 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1980) (disclosure of grand jury materials to parole commission harmless
error); Witham v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1979) (failure to seek change of venue not
ineffective assistance of council).
142. See also Nichols v. Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1999) (one-year grace period
permitted for filing habeas petition); Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1998) (use of
segregation and restraints violation of constitutional rights); Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076
(8th Cir. 1998) (policy considering sentencing factors contrary to early release statute); Anderson
v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1997) (consideration of invalid aggravating circumstance not
harmless error); Hochstein v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 143 (8th Cir. 1997) (failure to show defendant
would have received death penalty even without consideration of exceptional depravity
aggravator constitutional violation); Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457 (8th Cir. 1995) (act by trial
court informing defendant of right to file appeal denied defendant right to counsel); Chambers v.
Armontrout, 16 F.3d 257 (8th Cir. 1994) (order granting state additional period of time to retry
defendant appealable); Wealot v. Armontrout, 948 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1991) (defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights violated when not permitted to cross-examine complainant); Dickens
v. Armontrout, 944 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1991) (waiver of exhaustion defense offered by state
should have been accepted); Gilbert v. Lockhart, 930 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1991) (right to counsel
violated); Travis v. Lockhart, 925 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1991) (interpretation of state crediting
statute in violation of constitutional protection); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1990)
(equal protection claim fairly presented to state court); Brewer v. Swinson, 837 F.2d 802 (8th Cir.
1988) (concomitant issue permitted habeas review); DeVine v. Solem, 815 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir.
1987) (admissions by defendant required remand for determination of harmless error); Anderson
v. Frey, 715 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1983) (sheriff’s involvement in jury selection violation of due
process); Tinlin v. Parratt, 680 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1982) (ineffective assistance of counsel at
previous hearings permitted reversal); Cox v. Hutto, 619 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1980) (stipulation to
sentence by defense counsel without consent of defendant violated due process rights).
143. Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1987).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1367.
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exercise of their peremptory challenges, they are no longer entitled to a
presumption that they exercised their peremptory challenges in lawful
manner. 147 Judge McMillian further held that the district court properly
decided the defendant’s equal protection claim without holding an evidentiary
hearing, and the record supported the court’s finding that the prosecutor’s use
of peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause. 148
In Thomas v. Gunter, a Native American inmate brought a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 civil rights suit alleging that his constitutional rights to free exercise of
religion and to equal protection were violated because he was denied daily
access to a prison sweat lodge for prayer. 149 The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the prison officials holding that the denial of
extended daily access to a sweat house was rationally related to legitimate
penological interests. 150 The inmate appealed. 151 In affirming the district
court, Judge McMillian held that the denial of the inmate’s request for daily
and extended access to the sweat lodge, which was located near a truck
delivery entrance during hours in which the entrance was in use, was
rational. 152
SOCIAL SECURITY
In his early years on the court, Judge McMillian wrote many opinions
dealing with Social Security disability claims. 153 Many lawyers and judges
147. Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1987).
148. 916 F.2d at 1362.
149. Thomas v. Gunter, 103 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 1997).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. For cases in which benefits were granted, see Geigle v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir.
1992) (submission of new evidence permitted reconsideration); Ross v. Social Sec. Admin., 949
F.2d 1021 (8th Cir. 1991) (claim of improper payment of benefits not frivolous); Jeffcoat v.
Bowen, 840 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1988) (uncontradicted expert testimony demonstrated disability);
Highfill v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1987) (Secretary not estopped from reconsideration);
Folks v. Secretary of Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 825 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1987) (ALJ
failed to acknowledge shift in burden of proof); Anderson v. Heckler, 805 F.2d 801 (8th Cir.
1986) (ALJ’s failure to consider impairments and complaints of pain allowed reversal); Dover v.
Bowen, 784 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1986) (burden of proof not met by Secretary); Benson v. Heckler,
780 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1985) (record not fully developed and required remand); Sharrah v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services,( 747 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1984) (claimant determined to be
disabled); Jolly v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1984) (substantial evidence supported
determination of disability after specific date); Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1984)
(claimant’s disability within meaning of Social Security Act); Brenner v. Schweiker, 711 F.2d 96
(8th Cir. 1983) (evidence overwhelmingly supported determination of disability); McDonald v.
Schweiker, 698 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1983) (error in application of grid for disability and full
consideration of claims of pain required reversal); Gilliam v. Califano, 620 F.2d 691 (8th Cir.
1980) (expert testimony deficient to refute claim of disability); Hancock v. Secretary of Dep’t of
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have argued for a specialized court to hear Social Security cases. But Judge
McMillian has always supported the view that Social Security claims are so
important to the individual that it is far better that these cases be reviewed in a
generalist court rather than in a specialized court. His exacting review is best
illustrated in cases like Rainey v. Department of Health & Human Services. 154
In Rainey, a claimant sought review of the decision of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services denying his application for disability benefits based on
his heart condition. 155 After the district court affirmed the denial of benefits,
Judge McMillian reversed and remanded the case, holding that the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was required to give express reasons for
rejecting the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain. 156 The reasons
previously given by the ALJ did not indicate that the claimant’s participation
in minor activities was inconsistent with his allegations of disabling pain.157
RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD
In Bowman v. Railroad Retirement Board, 158 the petitioner filed an
application for disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act. 159 The
Railroad Retirement Board determined that the petitioner was not disabled, and
the petitioner sought review. 160 Upon review by the United States Court of
Appeals, Judge McMillian affirmed the denial of benefits, holding that a
hearing officer was justified in discounting the petitioner’s subjective
complaints of pain and that substantial evidence supported the determination
that the petitioner retained residual functional capacity to perform sedentary
work. 161 He further found substantial evidence supported the determination

Health, Educ. & Welfare, 603 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1979) (single report by physician not deemed
substantial evidence sufficient to uphold denial of benefits).
For cases in which benefits were denied, see Weber v. Apfel, 164 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 1999) (ALJ
warranted in discrediting physician’s opinions); Pertuis v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 1998)
(administrative record supported determination that no disability existed); Pyland v. Apfel, 149
F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1998) (substantial evidence supported determination that no disability existed);
Rowden v. Warden, 89 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies);
Board of Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995) (prohibition of
redistribution of costs from medical school); Pickner v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1993)
(substantial evidence supported denial of benefits); Eldridge v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.
1992) (failure to establish wage-earner paternity denied benefits); MacDonald v. Bowen, 850
F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1988) (evidence supported denial of benefits).
154. 48 F.3d 292 (8th Cir. 1995).
155. Id. at 293.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 952 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1991).
159. Id. at 208.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 211.
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that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the
petitioner was capable of performing. 162
In Arp v. Railroad Retirement Board, 163 a former railroad employee
appealed from the final decision of the Railroad Retirement Board affirming a
decision denying the employee’s application for employee disability annuity
under the Railroad Retirement Act. 164 Judge McMillian denied the petition,
holding that the Railroad Retirement Board’s determination that the former
employee had residual functional capacity to perform medium work and was
not entitled to disability annuity, was supported by substantial evidence despite
the employee’s exposure to toxic chemicals. 165 Similarly, in Carmack v.
Railroad Retirement Board, 166 a retired railroad employee petitioned for
review of an order of the Railroad Retirement Board denying his application
for disability annuity. 167 Judge McMillian affirmed the denial holding that
substantial evidence supported the Board’s order. 168
BLACK LUNG BENEFITS
Judge McMillian reviewed many cases where parties claimed a disability
from black lung disease. In Yauk v. Department of Labor, 169 the widow of a
coal miner sought black lung survivor’s benefits. 170 The Department of Labor
Benefits Review Board denied the petition, and the widow appealed. 171 In
permitting the benefits, Judge McMillian held that the ALJ improperly
determined that the miner did not have ten years of mining employment in
order to qualify for the presumption that the disability was caused by black
lung disease. 172 The ALJ failed to apply the rule under which the miner was
entitled to one year of credit for every year during which the evidence
established that he had worked 125 days in mines. 173 After applying the
formula, Judge McMillian found that the miner had the necessary ten years of
employment. 174 Furthermore, he concluded that a remand for further
consideration was not necessary because the claimant had satisfied the only

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
850 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 468.
928 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 270.
912 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.
Yauk, 912 F.2d at 195.
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other additional requirement, that he had sustained lung damage, and the
government had failed to rebut the presumption of disability. 175
In Hudson v. Department of Labor, 176 a claimant petitioned for review of a
Department of Labor Benefits Review Board order denying his claim for black
lung benefits. 177 Judge McMillian held, in granting the benefits, that the ALJ’s
finding that the claimant worked no more than seven years in coal mine
employment and, thus, was not entitled to the statutory presumption was not
supported by substantial evidence. 178 The record established at least ten years
of coal mine employment and, therefore, supported a finding of total disability
arising out of coal mine employment. 179
INSURANCE, CONTRACTS
In Mansker v. TMG Life Insurance Co., 180 the administrator of an insured’s
estate filed suit against an ERISA group health insurer, alleging that the insurer
owed benefits for hospital bills relating to a fatal injury sustained by the
insured employee when a gas stove exploded in his motor home. 181 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insured’s estate
administrator, and the insurer appealed. 182 In affirming the grant of summary
judgment, Judge McMillian held that the insured’s injuries were covered and
did not fall within the exclusion for injuries “arising from employment.” 183 He
found that the district court had the authority to determine benefits even though
an insurer had not made a determination as to reasonableness or necessity of
expenses. 184 He also found that the award of attorney fees at $200 per hour
was not excessive. 185
Additionally, in Continental Insurance Companies v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 186 an insurer brought suit against a
chemical producer and its former officers and directors seeking declaration that
the insurer was under no duty to defend from or to indemnify the producer for
liability arising out of environmental suits after the discovery of improper
disposal of hazardous waste. 187 The district court granted summary judgment

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 196.
851 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1988).
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
54 F.3d 1322 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1329.
Mansker, 54 F.3d at 1330.
842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 981.
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in favor of the insurer on one count and dismissed another count with
prejudice. 188
On rehearing en banc, Judge McMillian held that the
environmental contamination was “property damage” and the exposure theory
of coverage would provide for the insurer’s liability for damages caused by the
insured. 189 He found the term “damages,” as used in the standard general
liability insurance policy form, did not include cleanup costs under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”) or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). 190
In LaSociete Generale Immobiliere v. Minneapolis Community
Development Agency, 191 a real estate developer brought an action against a city
and the city’s community development authority asserting breach of contract
and due process claims arising from the city’s last-minute rejection of the
design for a proposed shopping area. 192 The district court entered judgment on
the jury verdict for the corporation but reduced the jury award. 193 On appeal,
Judge McMillian reversed the district court’s decision. 194 He wrote that, as a
matter of law, the contract unambiguously gave the city the right to approve
the development’s design and the trial court should not have sent to the jury
the question of whether the city breached the contract by rejecting the
design. 195 Judge McMillian also found that the developer was not hindered in
his efforts to obtain a second anchor tenant for the development so as to excuse
the developer’s nonperformance of contract. 196 Finally, he found that the
developer had not made a timely claim of delay by a lawsuit brought by
owners of the property in the area in question. 197
NATIVE AMERICANS
In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 198 an American Indian
Tribe, which sought tribal-state compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (“Act”), brought an action against the state and state officials alleging
violation of the Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 199 The district court denied the
Tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and both parties filed motions for

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 983-84.
Id. at 987.
44 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 637.
LaSociete Generale Immobiliere, 44 F.3d at 638.
Id.
3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id.
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summary judgment. 200 The district court denied the motions, and the parties
appealed. 201 Judge McMillian affirmed the district court’s denials and held
that the state could, in good faith, refuse to negotiate with the Tribe. 202 He
found that genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary
judgment about whether the state’s refusal to negotiate certain locations for
gaming facilities was a failure to negotiate in good faith under the Act, and the
action was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 203
OTHER SIGNIFICANT CASES
In the case of Starr v. Mandanici, 204 an ethics grievance was filed against
the Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr, alleging various violations. 205 The
complainant sought referral of the grievance for investigation and formal
disciplinary proceeding. 206 The district court denied the motion for recusal and
dismissed the complaints. 207 On appeal, Judge McMillian dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the complainant lacked standing
to commence formal action on the grievance and, thus, lacked standing to
appeal the grievance’s dismissal. 208
In so holding, he rejected the
complainant’s argument that standing existed because the vital interest derived

200. Id. at 275.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 281.
203. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 281. In addition, see United States v. Yankton,
168 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 1999) (offense of being an accessory after the fact to larceny not subject
to Indian Country Crimes Act’s exception to federal jurisdiction for Indian-on-Indian crimes);
Thomas v. Gunter, 103 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 1997) (Native American prison inmate’s equal
protection rights were not violated by prison officials’ denial of request for extended access to a
sweat lodge for prayer purposes); Shangreau v. Babbitt, 68 F.3d 208 (8th Cir. 1995) (the White
Earth Land Settlement Act of 1985, which barred child from inheriting compensation for illegally
taken allotment by right of representation through father, did not violate equal protection rights);
United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1993) (Justice Department’s internal policy, which
would preclude federal prosecution of any person previously prosecuted by another sovereign for
the same conduct, did not confer any substantive rights and, thus, did not preclude federal
prosecution even though the defendant had already been convicted in tribal court); United States
v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1990) (sentence imposed under Indian Major Crimes Act
only had to fall within range established by state law, but within that range, federal sentencing
guidelines are used); United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983) (statute denying
exclusive United States jurisdiction over punishment of offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, did not place exclusive jurisdiction in tribal courts, even
though offenses were not among the specified major crimes over which federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction).
204. 152 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 1998).
205. Id. at 742-43.
206. Id. at 743.
207. Id. at 742.
208. Id. at 751.
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from the uniqueness of the case and the proceedings forming its backdrop
conferred standing on all citizens. 209
In United States v. McDougal, 210 the President of the United States filed a
motion for a protective order to prevent the distribution of his videotaped
deposition testimony used at trial in the underlying criminal case. 211 The
district court denied physical access to the videotape and several media
organizations appealed. 212 Judge McMillian affirmed the district court’s
decision to deny access, holding that the videotape was not a judicial record for
purposes of the common law right of public access to judicial records. 213 He
concluded that even if the videotape was a judicial record, it was neither an
abuse of discretion nor a violation of the First Amendment to deny access
where the public and the press were given access to the information contained
in the videotape. 214
Finally, in Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Dalton, 215 Medicaid
providers and recipients challenged an amendment to the Arkansas
Constitution which prohibited the use of public funds for abortions except to
save the life of the mother. 216 The district court enjoined the enforcement of
the amendment. 217 An appeal was taken and consolidated with the decision of
the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska enjoining
enforcement of a Nebraska regulation which also prohibited the use of public
funds for abortions except to save the life of the mother. 218 Judge McMillian
affirmed the district court’s decisions and held that the challenged provisions
were invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 219 The Court of Appeal’s decision
was later overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Dalton v. Little
Rock Family Planning Services. 220 The Court held that as long as the program
was entirely state funded, the application of the program’s provisions would
not conflict with any federal statute, eliminating the bar on the validity of the
provisions. 221

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Starr, 152 F.3d at 748.
103 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 658.
60 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 503.
516 U.S. 474 (1996).
Id. at 476-77.
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DISSENTS
Judge McMillian has written some 245 dissents during his tenure on the
Court of Appeals. Many of them are significant. Although space and time
restrictions do not allow me to go into detail on the many dissents Judge
McMillian has written, I mention one of the more recent cases in which he
dissented to a per curiam denial of a certificate of appealability. 222 The
majority of the court denied a certificate to the petitioner, Arnold Hohn, who
sought a new trial under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that he was convicted
for an erroneous application of the “use” of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c)(2), arguing that it did not conform to the principles outlined in Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116S.Ct. 501 (1995). 223 The majority held that
this was not a claim of a constitutional right under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2). 224
Judge McMillian dissented because he felt the Due Process Clause did not
permit a federal conviction for conduct that does not violate a federal
statute. 225 In an emotional response, Judge McMillian concluded:
I conclude that depriving persons of the benefit of the delayed notice that
conduct is innocent violates Due Process by tolerating convictions for conduct
that was never criminal. Under that proposition, a post-Bailey § 2255 motion
presents a constitutional question as required by amended § 2253 (c)(2). I also
conclude Hohn’s case presents a “substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”
Accordingly, I would grant a certificate of
appealability. 226
The United States Supreme Court adopted Judge McMillian’s dissent and
reversed the case. 227
Dissents serve diverse purposes which are instrumental in defining the law.
Dissents often serve as a tool to sharpen the majority’s opinion by narrowing it
or perhaps by bringing about changes in some of the significant aspects of a
majority opinion. They are also helpful to the bench and bar by reason of the
fact that they narrow the issues involved in the case. Often, the dissent can
serve as a basis to change the law as future cases are handed down by this
court and other courts of appeals. The one outstanding aspect, particularly as
they pertain to Judge McMillian’s dissents, is that they demonstrate his
searching analysis of the law and his willingness to speak out where he feels
the majority is wrong.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Hohn v. United States, 99 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 892-93.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 895.
See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
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